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COMMENTARY
PROFESSOR MICHELMAN'S QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE RIGHT
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON*
Professor Michelman has constructed an elaborate edifice to support
his thesis that individuals sometimes (that is, when the state has already
acted to provide some people with some form of subsistence') have a
constitutional right to welfare.2 Michelman's present analysis is in part
the house that Ely built,3 but some aspects of it are vintage Michelman,
a restatement and refinement of the views presented a decade ago in his
effort to find in the fourteenth amendment a guarantee of minimum
protection.4 During the interim, the Supreme Court has changed5 and
the evolution of fourteenth amendment doctrine has followed new
paths,6 but Michelman's quest has continued, occasionally gathering
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1970, Vassar College; J.D.,
1973, University of California, Berkeley.
I. Michelman, We/fare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 662-
63, 684-85.
2. Michelman, supra note I.
3. See id. at 666-76.
4. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Protecting
the Poor]. See also Michelman. In Pursuit of Constitutional We/fare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theorr of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Constitutional
Wefare Rights]; Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles. Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Michelman,
States I Rights].
5. Since 1969, five of the nine justices' seats have changed occupants and, more significantly,
the Burger Court has succeeded the Warren Court. See generally Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term-Foreword On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5-16 (1978) [herein-
after cited as Ely, Fundamental Values]; 62 CORNELL L. REv. 401 (1977). The ten years since the
publication of Michelman's first welfare-right analysis, Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra
note 4, have witnessed simultaneous changes in relevant political priorities, notably a decline in
references to the national "War on Poverty." Cf. id. at 7 (forecasting conquest of "relative depri-
vation" through a "victorious War on Poverty").
6. See generally e.g., Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equalit, Legislative Classifications,
Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494 (1977); Monaghan, Of "Lib-
eriv" and "Propero," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Prop-
triv," Adudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977);
Washington University Open Scholarship
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
fresh sources of support7 but simultaneously encountering additional
obstacles8 requiring consideration, counterargument, or accommoda-
tion, building new layers of elaboration onto an already intricate struc-
ture. Nonetheless, the Michelman thesis remains attractive, though
elusive, and it is for this reason-because I want to be persuaded that it
works-that I record these reflections.
The latest incarnation of the welfare-rights theory substitutes for the
broad considerations of "basic wants,"9 "important needs,"' 0 and "fun-
damental rights"" a purportedly narrower criterion: "representation-
reinforcement" or "participation."' 2 Michelman sees as his task the
conversion of the skeptic 3 (though shoring up the faith of those of us
who have wanted to believe all along would be equally significant).
With the skeptic in mind, particularly the kind of skeptic likely to reject
such an inquiry from the start as one tainted by noninterpretivism,14
Michelman begins by using as his premise a special brand of interpreti-
vism developed in Professor John Hart Ely's recent work, in which Ely
posits and then seeks to resolve the paradox he finds in any effort to
follow the letter of the Constitution.'5 Since even a strict reading of
some of the Constitution's own provisions requires recognition of some
Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection For Personal L/fes yles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563
(1977); 62 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1977).
7. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 659 n.2.
8. See id. at 659-60 nn.3-7. More serious obstacles include the judicial decisions Michelman
discusses, id. at 688-93, as well as Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977). See text accompanying notes 70-115 infra.
9. See Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 4, at 13.
10. See id. at 22, 35.
11. Seeid. at 32.
12. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 669-70, 674, 677.
13. See id. at 664-65.
14. Id.
Professor Grey has posed these questions embodying the distinction between "interpretivism"
and "noninterpretivism":
In reviewing laws for constitutionality, should our judges confine themselves to deter-
mining whether those laws conflict with norms derived from the written Constitution?
Or may they also enforce principles of liberty and justice when the normative content of
those principles is not to be found within the four comers of our founding document?
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 703 (1975).
15. Ely, Constitutional Interfpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Ely, Constitutional Interpreivism]; Ely, Fundamental Values, supra note 5;
Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review]; see Michelman, supra note
1, at 664-76.
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principles external to the document itself, ' 6 Ely resolves this paradox of
literal interpretation by identifying participation in the democratic
process as the overarching value in the constitutional framework, the
spirit of the Constitution and its pervasive theme.' 7
Michelman seizes upon this "ultimate interpretivism,"' 8 in part be-
cause it is at the very least interpretivism in name,' 9 as a vehicle for
making his welfare-rights thesis palatable to the skeptic. In drastic sim-
plification, then, Michelman proceeds to reason that minimal food,
clothing, health care, and perhaps education are the sine qua non, the
"rock-bottom prerequisites"20 of meaningful participation in the demo-
cratic process. 2' Thus, judicial declarations ensuring such goods are
every bit as interpretivist as decisions invalidating poll taxes, ordering
reapportionment, and striking down official race discrimination.22
Michelman buttresses this conclusion in what, for me, is the most pro-
vocative facet of his analysis, by examining a number of Supreme
Court opinions involving welfare commodities. Though the Court pur-
portedly decided these cases on other grounds, Micheiman, by invoking
still other decisions, demonstrates that it must have been the subsis-
tence or welfare variable in the former set of cases that determined the
outcomes.23 This is so, he points out, notwithstanding the Court's re-
peated and vigorous disclaimers of a welfare-rights principle.24
Thus, Michelman leaves us with a refurbished and more conserva-
16. Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretit'ism, supra note 15; see Michelman, supra note 1, at 666-67.
17. Ely, Representation-Reinforcing JudicialRetiew, supra note 15; see Michelman, supra note
1, at 669-70.
18. Michelman, supra note 1, at 669.
19. See id. at 665-66 ("restrained ... transcontractualist" view), 676 ("quasi-interpretivist"
view),
20. Id. at 677.
21, Michelman admits that Ely himself has not yet identified the content of his representa-
tion-reinforcing mode of judicial review. See id. at 673.
22. See id. at 673-77.
23. See id. at 660-64, 686-93. Michelman does not, in so many words, invoke this series of
cases to support the welfare-rights content he has injected into Ely's theory. Instead, Michelman
suggests that these cases help define what he means by a "constitutional right," see id. at 660-62,
and dispel two predictable worries of the welfare-rights skeptic: that a constitutional welfare right
is "purely fanciful and that it thrusts inappropriate tasks on the courts," id. at 664. By contrast,
Michelman's use of Ely's work was meant to answer yet another concern, "want of an adequate
basis in law for the welfare-rights thesis." Id. Still, while responding to different causes of wel-
fare-rights skepticism, the various aspects of the analysis are complementary, and the dissection of
judicial opinions at least tries to show how Michelman's reading of Ely might work in practice.
24. See id. at 661-64, 677, 685.
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
718 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:715
tive welfare-rights thesis,25 but a welfare-rights thesis nonetheless-and
a host of still unanswered questions.
I. DECODING THE CASES AND PSYCHOANALYZING THE COURT
One of the most striking aspects of Michelman's effort is his analysis
of a number of Supreme Court decisions.26 In this analysis,
Michelman isolates a seemingly outcome-determinative variable-say,
an individual's interest in choosing his own household companions or
in traveling interstate-and then shows it to be unimportant through
reference to other cases involving the same variable but reaching diver-
gent results.27 Through such clusters of cases Michelman appears to
demonstrate that, notwithstanding its frequent protests to the contrary,
the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized or has come close to rec-
ognizing a right to minimal subsistence.2 Thus, for example, pairing
Sosna v. Iowa29 and Slarns v. Malkerson3 ° with Shapiro v. Thompson3'
and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County32 effectively neutralizes the
professed significance of the right to travel interstate, thereby leaving
the plaintiffs' success in the latter two cases explicable only by reference
to the fact that the challenged state action jeopardized a basic welfare
right.3
3
25. See id. at 666.
26. I am not certain why I find this part so striking, except that Michelman's detailed and
exhaustive attempt to make a long list of Supreme Court opinions support his theory-even where
many of those opinions explicitly reject his approach-is quite impressive. See note 23 .supra.
One gets the feeling that Michelman succeeds in pulling rabbits not only out of hats, but out of
thin air as well. Cf. Michelman, State's Rights, supra note 4, at 1166, 1180 (finding "surprising"
and unintended properties in Supreme Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976)). But see note 33 infra.
27. See Michelman, supra note I, at 661-62, 663 n.21, 686-87.
28. Seeid. at 661-64.
29. 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Iowa's durational residency requirement for divorce petitioners held
constitutional).
30. 401 U.S. 985 (1971), a 'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (Minnesota's durational
residency requirement for college tuition benefits held constitutional).
31. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Connecticut's durational residency requirement for subsistence al-
lowances held unconstitutional).
32. 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (Arizona's durational residency requirement for indigent's access to
free medical care held unconstitutional).
33. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 661-63 & n.21. Professor Tribe has cited some of the
same cases to make the same point, Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Feder-
alism andAffrmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1079-80 &
n.50 (1977), perhaps making Michelman's feat, supra note 26, less original though no less provoca-
tive. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 664 n.25.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/5
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This analysis, though stimulating, is characterized by a certain unre-
ality. Michelman begins as if deciphering hieroglyphics, shuffling and
reshuffling apparently unintelligible symbols until a meaningful pattern
emerges, but his attempt to translate the cases' purported foundations
into a message of his own succeeds only on a very selective basis. Al-
though his efforts may reconcile a limited universe of cases, he con-
cedes that his thesis "cannot be established by any purely empirical
method because a number of decisions over the same period and since
seem to contradict the thesis by their rhetoric as well as their results."34
And once the decisions and opinions inconsistent with Michelman's ap-
proach are considered together with the supposedly supportive data,
the signals become just as confusing as they were before. Perhaps the
right to travel will not alone make sense of one cluster of cases, 36 but a
welfare right will not decode still others.37
34. Michelman, supra note 1, at 663.
35. See id. at 663-64, 677, 686-93.
Questioning this aspect of Michelman's approach does not assume the illegitimacy of all efforts
to analyze judicial decisions by looking beyond the language of the opinions. Indeed, much im-
portant legal scholarship exhibits precisely this technique. The literature in the field of conflict of
laws provides a number of notable examples. See, e.g., Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
i'ersus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 209-11 (1958) (claiming that case
was decided by method other than that articulated in opinion); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a
Proper Forum: A "'Restatement" of the "Ler ForiApproach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340, 340-44 (1965)
(examination of "true rules" "guiding the actual solution of specific [conflicts] 'problems' "); Le-
flar, Conflicts Law. More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585
(1966) (introducing "true reasons... that actually lead, or should lead, the courts to one result or
another").
Professor Michelnan, however, proceeds a step further. Once all the relevant cases are consid-
ered and the contradictions acknowledged, his efforts to "psychoanalyze" the Court, see note 45
and text accompanying notes 44-54 infra, require one not only to read between the lines ofjudicial
opinions, but also to bend the apparently inconsistent decisions, see Michelman, supra note 1, at
688-93, and to reject the Court's explicit statements that it has not adopted the principle that
Michelman attributes to it. For me, at least, a theory that contradicts such express denials is very
different from an attempt to analyze or synthesize a court's divergent opinions by relying upon
extrapolation, additional judicial language, or even judicial silence. Although fact patterns and
case results are critical, those who have emphasized their significance have not suggested that one
can extract rules or theories from opinions explicitly renouncing those rules and theories. See
.generall Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi ofa Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Llewel-
lyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938). See alsoR. DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116-18 (1977).
36. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
37. I find, for example, the abortion-funding cases, see notes 70-89 infra and accompanying
text, difficult to square with Michelnan's welfare-rights thesis. Perhaps when the Supreme Court
reviews Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Il.), stay denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3772 (May 24,
1979) (Stevens, J.), prob. juris noted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3350 (Nos. 79-4, 79-5, 79-491 Nov. 26, 1979),
challenges to federal and state efforts to make public funds unavailable for some medically neces-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To the extent Michelman acknowledges the inconsistencies, he sug-
gests that we must look behind them to a barely defined theory surfac-
ing in the judicial unconscious, impelling the Justices to embrace
welfare-rights notions although disclaiming or perhaps unaware that
they are doing so. 8 But why? What is it about a welfare-rights thesis
that the Court simultaneously finds irresistible yet cannot (or feels
ashamed to) articulate, notwithstanding the theory's respectable aca-
demic following?39
Professor Michelman is not certain. According to him, it is all part
of the "queerness, on the one hand, of there being so much trouble
about admitting that everyone has a right to the means of subsistence at
a minimum social standard of decency; and the paradox, on the other,
of even thinking to cast the question in the language of rights or even
considering the matter as meet for legal disputation."40 Michelman
finds evidence of this "queerness" and "paradox" in numerous
Supreme Court opinions and invokes it in an effort to explain the di-
vergence of his analysis from the Court's own language.4'
Although Michelman proceeds to locate one source of this "queer-
ness"-one "root of the difficulty" 4 -in our habitual conception of
"natural" rights as "negative in character, '43 those observations offer
little in the way of conventional legal analysis designed not only to
explain existing decisions, but also to assist in fashioning meaningful
tools for future use by lawyers and by the Court itself.' And even if
sary abortions, Professor Michelman's analysis of cases like Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250 (1974), will be put to a more decisive test.
38. See Michelman, supra note I, at 662, 664, 685; cf. Michelman, States'Rights, supra note
4, at 1190, 1193 (finding in National League of Cities v. Usery "a morally creative judicial act
implying recognition of inchoate personal rights" and "a veiled thesis respecting states' service
roles").
Professor Michelman explained during the panel discussion of his paper that the inconsistencies
show that "the cases bother the Court or something is acting on the Court." Unedited Transcript
of Panel Discussion, Feb. 28, 1979, on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly.
39. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 659 n.2.
40. Id. at 679.
41. Id. at 679-80.
42. Id. at 680.
43. Id. See text accompanying notes 91-107 infra.
44. Early on, Professor Michelman explicitly disclaims "any 'realist' notion that the Constitu-
tion says whatever the judges make it say." Michelman, supra note 1, at 665. Consider here
Michelman, States' Rights, supra note 4, at 1192-95, where, in examining National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Michelman predicts that its use as precedent will reflect its
articulated concept of state sovereignty rather than the unexpressed "veiled thesis respecting
states' service roles," Michelman, States' Rights, supra note 4, at 1193, offered in Michelman's
analysis. See also R. DwORKIN, supra note 35, at 144 n.l (citing A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME
[Vol. 1979:715
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the least of Michelman's concerns is being "conventional," when he
resorts to what comes close to rejecting explicit reasoning in favor of
"psychoanalytic" explanation, one is uncertain how to evaluate the
points he has raised-by probing further (presuming one knows how)
into the Justices' unexpressed thoughts to ascertain whether Michelman
is correct or by accepting Michelman's conclusion for want of knowl-
edge how to counter assertions made at this level.45
The uneasy balance between the intellectual appeal of Michelman's
persistent originality and the constraints of conventional legal analysis
reminds me of a defense occasionally asserted in criminal cases: to the
extent that one of the essential elements of an offense charged is a par-
ticular mental state,46 criminal defendants have sometimes invoked a
theory of psychological determinism to show that they were incapable
of entertaining the required mental state and, if they appeared to do so,
their conduct was not the product of conscious individual choice but
rather the culmination of hereditary and environmental forces over
which they could exercise no control.47 Though the defense would
seem compelling not only to the extent it negatives the requisite mens
rea4x but also in its apparent preclusion of a voluntary act, a necessary
precondition of any criminal conduct,49 courts have rejected such argu-
ments, explaining that "deterministic theories of the unconscious are
logically irrelevant because the legal definitions of premeditation, in-
tent, and malice [required elements of some crimes] are framed in
terms of conscious thought."5 Whatever the merits of psychodynamic
theory, it offers little in a system of criminal justice premised on per-
sonal blame.'
This aspect of Professor Michelman's theory evokes a similar reply.
COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970)); Currie, supra note 35, at 210-11 ("the purpose [of
evaluating cases as precedents] is to provide a basis for predicting future decisions, and for that
practical purpose it is often necessary to read between the lines of the opinion"); Llewellyn, supra
note 35, at 1256.
45. Such inquiries have been undertaken by other legal scholars. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG,
PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1971).
46. Seegenerally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 87-88 (3rd
ed. 1975).
47. See, e.g. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210
A.2d 193 (1965).
48. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra note 46, at 87-88.
49. See id. at 73-82.
50. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1179 (1973).
51. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 478-79, 210 A.2d 193, 207 (1965) (Weintraub, C.J., con-
curring).
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However intellectually engaging his analysis, its use remains unclear.
Michelman writes that the cases consistent with his thesis "could be
cited in support of welfare rights should the Court eventually come to
see them as a correct conclusion from accepted forms of legal argu-
ment.""2 But Michelman's "should" is a big "if' that the cases them-
selves do not address. At this juncture the difficulty with the welfare-
rights thesis is not one caused by straying from the written Constitu-
tion, Michelman's professed concern,53 but rather one engendered by
venturing beyond the judicial texts-with their frequently adverse
"rhetoric [and] results" 54 -into analytical quicksand affording little
hope of extrication.
II. THE NEED FOR INITIAL STATE ACTION:
ACTIVATING THE "RIGHT"
In apparent rejoinder to those who would criticize a welfare-rights
thesis as conceptually boundless or wanting in meaningful standards
and limits, 55 Professor Michelman offers the following pair of argu-
ments. First, this right to minimal subsistence becomes operative only
when a governmental body has chosen to provide some welfare benefits
to some persons.56 Given this foundation, courts may then intervene at
the behest of a challenger and, employing the available array of consti-
tutional criteria, determine whether this governmental largesse has
been accorded in proper amounts to the proper class of individuals and
administered with proper procedural safeguards.57 The "lack of judi-
cially manageable standards"5 " problem is obviated, according to
Michelman, because it is the state's own initial action that provides the
measure and specifies the content of the right:59 no state action, no
52. Michelman, supra note I, at 664.
53. See id at 664-65.
54. Id. at 663.
55. See id. at 659-60, 664.
56. Id. 662-63, 684-85. Professor Michelman has made the same point elsewhere. See
Michelman, Constitutional Wefare Rights, supra note 4, at 1012-15; Michelman, Slates' Rights,
supra note 4, at 1191. So has Professor Tribe. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
919-20 (1978); Tribe, supra note 33, at 1084 n.75, 1089.
57. Michelman, supra note 1, at 685.
58. Cf. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (N.D. I11. 1968) (rejecting plaintiffs' theory
of constitutional right to state expenditures based on pupils' "educational needs" for lack of" 'dis-
coverable and manageable standards' by which a court can determine when the Constitution is
satisfied and when it is violated"), a'dsub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
59. Michelman, Constitutional We/fare Rights, supra note 4, at 1013-15.
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enforceable right. Second, Michelman cites what he sees as the
Supreme Court's existing decisions in the welfare-rights area as evi-
dence of the Court's own unarticulated and intuitive adoption of a wel-
fare right60 and of the ease with which the judiciary can handle such
claims.
61
Both responses are flawed. The first is particularly unsatisfactory be-
cause it raises more questions than it answers. If subsistence is itself a
constitutional right,62 why is official action providing subsistence to
some persons necessary to activate judicial recognition of the right?
One answer might be that a number of constitutional provisions-nota-
bly the equal protection and due process clauses-become applicable
only once a state has acted. But if it is a constitutional right to subsis-
tence-as distinguished from simply a right to equal treatment or pro-
cedural due process in the governmental provision of a good or
service 63-of which Michelman writes, then how can it be such a con-
tingent and "sometime thing?"6 4 Individual substantive constitutional
rights, as that term is ordinarily used, exist and are enforceable in-
dependent of state action or even in spite of it, but not solely because of
it.6" Michelman's view, while circumventing the problem of standard-
lessness, results in a redefinition of the notion of a constitutional enti-
60. Michelman, supra note 1, at 662-64.
61. Id. at 664.
62. Michelman emphasizes repeatedly that it is a constitutional welfare right he seeks to es-
tablish. E.g., id at 659-60, 664-65, 679.
63. Michelman clearly means to make this distinction. See id. at 660, 686-93.
64. In other words, Michelman cannot have it both ways. If his right is constitutional, then
its existence cannot depend upon official action, unless he means a right like that of equal protec-
tion or procedural due process--one that simply requires that governmental action satisfy a con-
stitutional standard with no identifiable content of its own. If, on the other hand, Michelman
means that his right has a specific content guaranteed by the Constitution, then he cannot, it seems
to me, disallow the assertion of that right by, for example, individuals in states where the legisla-
ture has failed to take any action regarding subsistence. Cf id. at 685 n.128 ("Perhaps under
appropriate circumstances [the purely quiescent state] can be said to deny the equal protection of
the laws, but only with an obvious strain on usage.").
65. Cf Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ("A right which. comes into
existence only by virtue of an act of Congress, and which may be withdrawn by an act of Congress
after its exercise has begun, cannot well be described as a constitutional right.").
Michelman's reliance on Dworkin's glossary, see Michelman, supra note 1, at 660 n.9, provides
no escape from this difficulty. Whatever his definition of "rights" generally (and his differentia-
tion of background, legislative, and legal rights), Dworkin clearly sees constitutional rights as
being of a higher order than rights or interests accruing from legislative action. See R. DWORKiN,
supra note 35, at 117, 133, 185, 215, 269. In other words, though borrowing parts of Dworkin's
vocabulary, Michelman seems to part company with him on this notion of constitutional rights
that come into being only upon legislative action.
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tlement and a twisting of the old saw about there being a remedy for
the violation of every right. As Michelman himself has observed in the
past, such redefinitions can yield internal inconsistencies and unantici-
pated results.66 At most, then, Michelman has given us a new concept
of "constitutional right" and little assistance in harmonizing his thesis
with our existing notions of substantive constitutional guarantees. 67
Michelman's second response to the "standards" problem is more in-
telligible and intuitively more appealing. Yet the cases Michelman
cites as illustrations of the Court's facility in adjudicating welfare rights
miss the mark, for, as Michelman concedes, those cases-often ex-
pressly decided on other grounds--disclaim recognition of a constitu-
tional right to subsistence.68 Those cases show at most, then, only the
judicial manageability of the grounds articulated by the Court for such
decisions; they tell us nothing about whether a court would find equally
tractable Michelman's alternative justification for the same result.69
III. THE ABORTION-FUNDING CASES: POSITIVE VERSUS NEGATIVE
RIGHTS AND RELATED DIFFICULTIES
Perhaps it is significant that Michelman's paper makes no reference
to the recent Supreme Court decisions inflicting the most crippling
blow to his thesis:7" the abortion-funding cases, Maher v. Roe7t and
Poelker v. Doe.7 2
Michelman's position, both in its initial formulation 3 and in its pres-
ent restatement, amounts to a brief against a limited class of wealth
classifications. In that sense, it belongs to the same theoretical family
66. See generally Michelman, States' Rights, supra note 4.
67. Professor Tribe does no better. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 920
(1978) ("All of these doctrines [of affirmative constitutional rights] depend for their efficacy upon
some initial choices by government; if the state and federal governments were to wash their hands
altogether of the sick, hungry, and poor, none of the interstitial doctrines sketched here could
provide a remedy.").
68. Michelman, supra note I, at 663-64, 677, 685.
69. Even a successful effort to show unsatisfactory or to explain away the reasoning invoked
by the Court in these cases is of little help here. See id. at 686-93. It only demonstrates that the
Court should have articulated other reasons, not what the broader ramifications of such other
reasons might have been.
70. A passing reference to dictum from Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), does appear in
one footnote. Michelman, supra note 1, at 677 n.99.
71. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
72. 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam).
73. See Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 4.
[Vol. 1979:715
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/5
COMMENTARY
as the arguments advanced by challengers in such litigation as Grffin v.
Illinois,74 Douglas v. California, 5 Boddie v. Connecticut,76 San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez,77 and the abortion-funding
cases. 8 All of those cases asked the Court to equalize access to certain
goods or services by neutralizing a payment requirement that, in effect,
foreclosed enjoyment by those too poor to pay the price. Thus, the so-
called "wealth classifications" challenged in those cases were not lines
purposely drawn by the state with any apparent view toward discrimi-
nating against the indigent, but rather were the result of the state's fail-
ure to insure that the indigent, like the nonindigent, would be able to
partake of the benefit in question.79 Though the Court in some of its
early forays seemed to embrace the view that the fourteenth amend-
ment bars such "classifications," at least in some contexts, 80 a majority
of the Justices met the argument with a cold shoulder in Rodriguez"
and gave it the kiss of death five years later in the abortion-funding
cases.
In Maher v. Roe,82 a constitutional challenge to Connecticut's exclu-
sion of nontherapeutic abortions from a welfare program that provided
public assistance for medical expenses related to pregnancy and child-
birth, the Court rejected the contention that "the fact that the impact of
the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay" 3 violates the equal
protection clause. According to the majority, "every denial of welfare
to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to
74. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (equal protection compels states that condition full direct appellate
review of criminal convictions on documents requiring trial transcript to furnish such transcripts
to indigents).
75. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (equal protection compels state to furnish indigent with counsel for
single appeal as of right).
76. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process requires state to afford indigent access to divorce
courts),
77. 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (equal protection does not require elimination of interdistrict disparities
in educational expenditures).
78. See notes 71-72 supra.
79. See. e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,23 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) ("the evil is. . . discrimination
against the indigent"); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) ("There can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.").
81. 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) ("at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages").
82. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
83. Id. at 471.
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nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services." 84
Strict judicial scrutiny of a wealth classification, with its resulting likeli-
hood of invalidation,85 must, therefore, rest on the classification's im-
pingement upon a fundamental right.8 6 The Court found no such right
jeopardized by Connecticut's failure to pay for abortions for the poor.87
In Poelker v. Doe,88 the Court employed similar constitutional analysis
to validate the policy choice of the city of St. Louis to provide publicly
financed hospital services for childbirth without providing correspond-
ing services for nontherapeutic abortions.8 9
These cases present a number of difficulties for Professor
Michelman. First, they refute decisively the argument that poverty it-
self is a ground for special judicial solicitude.90 Perhaps more signifi-
cant is a clear distinction emerging in these cases between recognition
of a right as fundamental or constitutionally protected, on the one
hand, and a right to have the state assume the cost necessary for the
exercise of that right, on the other. Thus, the Court explains that al-
though a woman's abortion decision is (within certain limits9l) consti-
tutionally protected from undue state interference,92 the state need not
pay for abortions for the indigent, provided that the state has a rational
basis for refusing to pay.93 Analogously, although the Constitution
protects the right to travel interstate, the government need not pay for
bus fares for the poor.94 This line of reasoning suggests that Professor
Michelman must convince us that the Constitution not only immunizes
subsistence (or whatever the content ascribed to his welfare right) from
undue state interference, but also requires state financing of such goods
for those lacking the necessary funds.95
84. Id.
85. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword." In Search ofEvolhng Doctrine
on a Changing Court: 4 Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
86. 432 U.S. at 471.
87. Id. at 471-74.
88. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
89. Id. at 521.
90. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
91. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1977).
92. Id. at 474-76.
93. Id. at 478. See generally Appleton, The Abortion-Funding Cases and Population Control
An Imaginary Lawsuit (and Some Reections on the Uncertain Limits ofReproductive Privacy), 77
MICH. L. REV. 1688 (1979).
94. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8.
95. The analysis of the abortion-funding cases here is meant to serve the limited purpose of
illustrating the negative right-positive right dichotomy. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
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Although Michelman, relying substantially upon Charles Fried,96 ac-
knowledges the distinction between "negative rights" and "positive
rights,"97 he fails to resolve satisfactorily the tension this dichotomy
produces. For if Michelman's reliance on the Ely thesis of representa-
tion-reinforcement is sound, it seems only to compel the conclusion
that subsistence is a negative right;98 it does not necessarily fill the re-
maining gap between the negative and the positive right.99 To con-
This discussion is not designed to raise such questions as whether the right to abortion is represen-
tation-reinforcing (Michelman concludes that it probably is not, see Michelman, supra note 1, at
676-77) or whether initial state action is necessary to activate whatever positive right may be at
Ntake (consider here the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978), and
imilar state laws constricting the range of abortions for which public funding is available; com-
pare Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2181 (1979), with Doe
* Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1979)). The Supreme Court may take the opportunity for
a more penetrating analysis of such questions when it reviews Zbaraz v. Quem, 469 F. Supp. 1212
(N.D. ILL.), star denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3772 (May 24, 1979) (Stevens, J.), prob. juris noted, 48
U.S.LW. 3350 (Nos. 79-4, 79-5, 79-491 Nov. 26, 1979).
96. Michelman, supra note 1, at 681-84. See generally C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
97. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 680-85.
98. Some explanation may be appropriate here because consideration of subsistence as a
negative constitutional right requires visualizing attempted state interference with an individual's
enjoyment of food, shelter, and the like, acquired through that individual's own legitimate means.
Admittedly, imagining a state official taking food out of one's mouth is difficult. Yet other facets
of Michelman's welfare right lend themselves more readily to a negative-right characterization.
For example, health care apparently falls within the scope of Michelman's welfare right, see
Michelman, supra note 1, at 659, 677, and yet the government interferes significantly with what
some consider necessary health care. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287,
1298-301 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (FDA's laetrile ban offends constitutional right to privacy of termi-
nally ill cancer patients), aff'd on other grounds, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct.
2470 (1979). Similarly, it is not difficult to imagine governmental interference with an individual's
basic education, another aspect of Michelman's right, see Michelman, supra note 1, at 659, 677.
Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476-77 (1977) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), as cases concerning unreasonable governmen-
tal interference with constitutionally protected educational choices).
99. Michelman identifies "protection for access on an equal footing to political acts and ac-
tivities," Michelman, supra note 1, at 674-75, and "protection against stigmatizing discriminations
• . in the . . . political process," id. at 675, as the "twin foci," id. at 674, of rights properly
described as representation-reinforcing. Although Michelman's use of the word "protection" in
identifying each "core," id., intimates that the rights in question are of the positive variety, see C.
FRIED, supra note 96, at 110-111, I am not persuaded that either Michelman or Ely meant to
classify representation-reinforcing rights as positive. I base this conclusion on a number of in-
dependent but related grounds. First, if Michelman had read Ely's thesis as one explicitly embrac-
ing a number of positive rights, then I think that Michelman would have found unnecessary the
lengthy discussion of Fried, Michelman, supra note 1, at 681-84, and of the difficulty of accommo-
dating positive rights in our ordinary notion of preinstitutional rights, id. at 680-81. Second, at
least in the context of preinstitutional or background rights, Professor Michelman seems to regard
governmental enforcement or protection as something other than the fulfillment of a positive
right, see id at 680-81 & n. 11. Thus, Professor Michelman apparently departs here from Fried's
distinction between negative and positive rights and Fried's view that governmental duties of
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clude that the state must provide subsistence, Michelman must reason
that there is something so special about the benefits in question (food,
clothing, health care, education, and whatnot) that the negative and
positive rights in this context are not meaningfully distinguishable. 00
But that suggestion simply returns us to another version of the ques-
tions raised earlier:' 0 ' what are the standards for differentiating "spe-
cial" from "nonspecial" benefits for purposes of this analysis?' 02 As
Michelman asked once before, "why education and not golf?.' 0 3 Or,
to put the problem more cogently, why food and shelter, but not abor-
tion?'" After all, in the context of abortion, the Supreme Court has
expressly recognized a negative right rooted in the Constitution, 05 but
has refused to adopt its positive counterpart. 0 6 What is it about food
and shelter, then, that compels both positive and negative recogni-
tion?'0 7
protection fall within the latter category. See C. FRIED, supra note 96, at 111. Finally, even if
Michelman would regard governmental protection of individual negative rights as an affirmative
duty--that is, as fulfillment of a positive right--still he seems to consider such protection or en-
forcement as forming a class apart from the sorts of positive rights for which he tries to make a
case under the Constitution. See Michelman, supra note I, at 684 (describing welfare rights as
"an exceptional class of positive rights," thereby implying, inter alia, that the rights of "protec-
tion" directly flowing from Ely's thesis form a different class). In summary, then, notwithstanding
Michelman's use of the word "protection" in his consideration of Ely's representation-reinforcing
rights, Michelman recognizes that to establish his constitutional welfare right he must reach at
least one step beyond Ely into the troublesome realm of positive rights. See id. at 680-81, 684.
100. In other words, the Michelman theory requires not only a negative welfare right-immu-
nity from governmental interference with subsistence as one may acquire it, see note 98 supra-
but also a positive welfare right--entitlement to governmental provision of subsistence whenever
one is unable to acquire it. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 677-78.
101. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
102. Michelman uses the term "importance" in this context. Michelman, supra note 1, at 679-
80. Michelman admits here to have crossed the line into transtextual constitutional analysis, id.,
although still within the bounds of Ely's limiting principle of representation-reinforcement. See
id. at 665-66, 674. See also text accompanying notes 116-39 infra.
103. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 4, at 59. See Tribe, supra note 33, at 1066.
104. This question should not be read to mean that abortion is more conducive to representa-
tion-reinforcement than food and shelter. Under Michelman's view, it probably is not. See
Michelman, supra note 1, at 676-77. The purpose of the question is instead to emphasize the
delineation of positive and negative rights and to demonstrate that judicial recognition of a nega-
tive right does not necessarily entail recognition of a corresponding positive right. See note 95
supra and notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text.
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). See generally
Appleton, supra note 93.
107. Presumably, Michelman would answer that food and shelter tend to be representation-
reinforcing in a way that abortion does not. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 676-77. But that
response does not by itself explain why the right to subsistence must be a positive one. See note
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The abortion-funding cases pose still another obstacle for Professor
Michelman. As he notes in his paper, one perennial criticism of any
transliteral approach"' to the Constitution is the potentially limitless
power it accords to the judiciary and the resulting antimajoritarianism
it yields.'" 9 Decisions regarding what kind of welfare to provide, how
much, and to whom are arguably matters appropriately left to a major-
ity of the people through their elected representatives." t0 Reliance on
Ely's criterion of representation-reinforcement was meant, in part, to
meet such objections:"' only those variables necessary for effective
participation in the political process are to be afforded special protec-
tion." 2 But the abortion-funding cases suggest that majoritarianism
has several faces. Not only do the people have a financial interest in
decisions regarding allocations of public benefits, but they may have an
expressive interest at stake as well.' Thus the Court observed in the
abortion-funding cases that the failure to cover nontherapeutic abor-
tions in a state medical assistance program may have been prompted by
the desire of the electorate to "[express] a preference for normal child-
birth"' " over its alternative, abortion. Compelling the provision of
particular goods and services not only reorders funding priorities deter-
mined democratically, but also may divest the public of an opportunity
to express its complete disfavor of particular activities.' '
100 supra. There may be many social programs that might enhance representation, e.g., free
transportation to the polls, but that does not place the government under any affirmative obliga-
tion to institute them. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 670. Cf. McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (no right to absentee ballots for certain prisoners).
108. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 665-66. See also note 14 supra.
109. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 659-60, 664-66, 670-71, 674, 684.
110. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (mayor's "policy of denying city funds for
abortions such as that desired by Doe is subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at
the poll,"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) ("when an issue involves policy choices as
sensitive as those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum
for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature"). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1970).
1 1. See Michelman, supra note 1, at 664-74.
112. See id.
113. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-80 (1977). Of course, first amendment freedoms do
not necessarily carry with them the freedom to act in accordance with the views expressed. Cf.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (first amendment protects parental right to send
children to private schools promoting belief that racial segregation is desirable, but practice of
excluding racial minorities from such schools is not protected by the same principle).
114. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (emphasis added).
115. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1218-19 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (quoting Illinois state
senator Lemke: "My people don't want abortions being performed with their money. If it costs
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IV. THE ELY PREMISE: PROCESS OR SUBSTANCE?
The primary difference between Michelman's old welfare-rights the-
sis and this born-again effort is the incorporation of Professor Ely's rep-
resentation-reinforcement test into the latter." 6 After considerable
searching and apparent frustration," 7 Ely concludes that representa-
tion-reinforcement is the gauge for distinguishing constitutionally
guaranteed rights not expressly included in the text of the document
from interests ineligible for such protection."' According to Ely, this
"participational orientation denotes a form of review that concerns it-
self with how decisions affecting value choices and distributing the re-
sultant bounty are made;""' 9 it is "something different from old-
fashioned value imposition."'' 20
Michelman contends that judicial recognition of a constitutional
right to subsistence satisfies the representation-reinforcement or "broad
participation"' 2' test and thus avoids the charges of transliteralism per-
sistently leveled against that approach in the past 22 because, in
Michelman's words, "life itself, health and vigor, presentable attire, or
shelter not only from the elements but from the physical and psycho-
them more to support these children after they're born, they will pay that money gladly as long as
it's properly used."), stay denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3772 (May 24, 1979) (Stevens, J.),prob.juris noted,
48 U.S.L.W. 3350 (Nos. 79-4, 79-5, 79-491 Nov. 26, 1979). Cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (equal protection "mean[s] that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group ["hippies"] cannot constitute a legitimate governmental inter-
est").
In addition to the phrase quoted from Poelker, see text accompanying note 114 suvra, the
Court's repeated talk of "encouraging normal childbirth," see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478
(1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977), seems also to have an expressive dimension. See
generally Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases-. A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in Ameri-
can Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978); Note, Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution,
54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 120, 129-30 (1979). Cf. Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of
University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879, 891-96 (1979) (use of governmental funding to achieve
important interests including first-amendment interest in academic freedom). For another sug-
gested overlap between the abortion-funding cases and first amendment doctrine, see Canby, Gov-
ernment Funding, Abortions, and the Public Forum, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 11.
116. See Michelman, supra note I, at 666.
117. See Ely, Constitutional Interretiv/sm, supra note 15; Ely, Fundamental Values, supra note
5.
118. See Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra note 15.
119. 1d. at454 n.13.
120. Id. at 454.
121. Michelman, supra note 1, at 669 (quoting Ely, Representation-Reinforcing JudicialRevie,
supra note 15, at 470).
122. Id. at 659-60, 664-74.
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logical onslaughts of social debilitation"' 2 3 are the "universal, rock-
bottom prerequisites of effective participation in democratic represen-
tation-even paramount in importance to education and, certainly, to
the niceties of apportionment, districting, and ballot access on which so
much judicial and scholarly labor has been lavished."' 24
The intuitive appeal of the argument is compelling, but is it what
Professor Ely had in mind? Unlike Michelman's translation of repre-
sentation-reinforcement into specific substantive goods,'25 Ely's em-
phasis seems more narrowly focused on process. True, he writes of
"broadened access to the processes and payoffs of representative gov-
ernment"'' 26 and of ensuring "the opportunity to participate either in
the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and
accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have
reached."' 27 The question that Michelman's reliance upon Ely raises is
whether the latter's understanding of "payoffs" and "accommodation"
should be read to encompass substantive goods such as food, shelter,
and the like.
My best guess (best from a distance, that is, without attempting to
consult Professor Ely himself) is that Michelman has taken the Ely
formula beyond its intended limits. This assessment is based in part
upon Ely's earlier work, which he has not expressly repudiated, 28 and,
more significantly, upon the asserted distinction in his present work be-
tween his position and judicial review designed to provide "a series of
particular substantive goods or values deemed fundamental."'129 What
are food, shelter, and the other ingredients of Michelman's welfare
right if not "particular substantive goods . . . deemed fundamen-
tal?"'130
In particular, reference to "payoffs" must be considered in context.
Ely writes of "access. . . to the payoffs,"' 3 1 certainly a notion consis-
123. Id. at 677.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 670.
126. Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 453 (emphasis added);
see id. at 456.
127. Id. at 456 (emphasis added).
128. See Ely, The Wages of Cr)ing Wof .4 Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973). See also Ely, Fundamental Values, supra note 5, at 10-12.
129. Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 453-54.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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tent with a nonsubstantive approach.'3 2 And though Ely does allow
that his participation-oriented mode of judicial review is "linked to a
system of presumptively equal participation in the payoffs [the] process
[of government] generates,"'' 33 he still seems to employ "payoffs" to de-
note the procedural "benefits of government,"'' 34 i e., participating in a
representative democracy, rather than the particular substantive goods
that elected officials may or may not decide to provide at public ex-
pense. 35 Ely seems to use "[p]articipat[ion] . . . in the accommoda-
tion"'136 in a similar sense, to signify engaging in the making of political
adjustments and in the reaching of political solutions to problems
rather than insuring that that process yields particular outcomes.
137
I suppose, at this point, Professor Michelman might say that, even so,
132. Here, I mean to contrast the goal of "access to. . . the payoffs" with the goal of provid-
ing those payoffs themselves. For example, judicial decisions striking down racial discrimination
promote equal access to such substantive payoffs as suburban home ownership, see Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), without guaranteeing that all members of minority groups
who so desire will enjoy such benefits in fact. The negative right-positive right dichotomy re-
enters the analysis here. See text accompanying notes 96-107 supra.
133. Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 456.
134. Id. at 470.
135. See also note 110 supra.
136. Ely, Representation-Reinforcing Judicial Review, supra note 15, at 456.
137. Additional excerpts from Ely should eliminate all doubt:
Participation itself can obviously be regarded as a value, but that does not collapse the
two modes of review [representation-reinforcement and fundamental-value imposition) I
am describing into one. As I am using the terms, value imposition refers to the designa-
tion of certain goods (rights or whatever) as so important they must be insulated from
whatever inhibition the political process might inflict, whereas a participational orienta-
tion denotes a form of review that concerns itself with how decisions effecting value
choices and distributing the resultant bounty are made. I surely do not claim that the
words have to be used thus-there is even doubt that "participational" deserves to be
recognized as a word at all--or even that these are the meanings they would inevitably
convey. I claim only that this is how I am using them, and that so used they do not mean
the same thing as each other.
If the objection is not that I have not distinguished two concepts but rather that one
might well "value" fair decision procedures for their own sake, of course it is right: one
might. And to one who insisted on that terminology, my point would be that the "val-
ues" the Court should pursue are "participational values" of the sort I have mentioned,
since those are the "values" (1) with which our Constitution has preeminently and most
successfully concerned itself, (2) whose "imposition" is not incompatible with, but on the
contrary supportive of, the American system of representative democracy, and (3) that
courts set apart from the political process are uniquely situated to "impose."
Id. at 454 n.13.
Later Ely adds, inter alla:
[M]y claim is only that the original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say
overwhelmingly, dedicated to concerns of process and structure and not to the identifica-
tion and preservation of specific substantive values.
Id. at 475.
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Ely simply has not gone far enough, for participation-even of a pure
process-oriented variety-requires that the participants be free from
starvation, disease, and the like. 138  But that rejoinder only attaches
additional significance to the difficulty of defining the proposed welfare
right and identifying its limits. 139 In other words, drawing a line be-
tween substantive goods that must be provided regardless of demo-
cratic decision and those which can be left to the political process
becomes critical-but not necessarily manageable-here.
V. CONCLUSION
Though Michelman's latest effort is not a clone of his earlier work,
the resemblance is strong. The continuing appeal of its theoretical
core-the notion that the Constitution guarantees a right to minimal
subsistence-attests to that idea's resilience and strength. But appeal,
resilience, and strength do not by themselves make convincing constitu-
tional theory, and some of us who would like to join Professor
Michelman's camp must ask him for still more.
And finally:
The approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is akin to what might
be called an "antitrust" as opposed to a "regulatory" approach to economic affairs-
rather than dictate substantive results it intervenes only when the "market," in our case
the political market, is malfunctioning. (A referee analogy is also not far off. the referee
is to intervene only when one team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the "wrong"
team has scored.) Our government cannot fairly be said to be "malfunctioning" simply
because it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree, however strongly (and
claims that it is reaching results with which "the people" really disagree-or would if
they "understood"-are likely to be little more than self-deluding projections). In a rep-
resentative democracy, value determinations are to be made by our elected representa-
tives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can kick them out of office. Malfunction
occurs whenever the process cannot be trusted ....
Id. at 486. See generall)' Ely, Fundamental Values. supra note 5.
138. See Michelman, supra note I, at 677. Fried, as Michelman notes, id. at 681-84, travels
much of the same territory. See C. FRIED, supra note 96, at 120-22.
139. See text accompanying notes 55-69 supra.
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